

Categorical Politics

Gender, Race, and Public Opinion

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Research on public opinion is booming, and this holds particularly for investigations that center on gender or on race. For those of us trying to keep up, it is downright alarming. Every time we turn around, there are more papers to read, more books to review, more conferences to attend, and more findings to assimilate. Our purpose here is to bring some order and coherence to this lively and rapidly expanding field of scholarship.

We begin by enumerating important features that gender and race share in common and then point out one major difference. This one difference, which has to do with how gender and race are organized in society, has far-reaching ramifications for the distinct roles that gender and race play in public opinion. Or so we try to show here, as we take up a series of consequential political puzzles: the changing relationship between gender and race and the American party system; gender gaps and racial divides in public opinion on policy; gender and race as sources of group solidarity; gender and race as objects of attitude; and, finally, the activation of gender and race in politics. In the conclusion, we speculate, cautiously, on the future.¹

Important Similarities between Gender and Race—And One Big Difference

Gender and race are alike in several important respects. Both are socially constructed; both are central to how we think about ourselves and about others; and both represent relationships of ongoing inequality. Gender and race also differ from one another—most notably, in the way that men and women, on the one hand, and blacks and whites, on the other, are distributed in everyday life. Understanding the parts played by gender and by race in public opinion begins with an appreciation of these factors.

Gender and Race as Social Constructions

Sex is a biological concept. It has to do with genetic structure, with physiology, and anatomy. Women give birth, breast-feed infants, and menstruate;

men do not. On average, men are larger and stronger. These physical facts of life are real—but they are trivial compared to the extraordinary and far-reaching arrangements and practices that constitute relations between men and women in modern society. This is gender. Gender is what society makes of sex.²

Much the same can be said about race. If, as the *Oxford English Dictionary* asserts, race is “One of the great divisions of mankind, having certain physical properties in common,” then, according to modern biology, no such thing exists. The idea that all of human diversity can be reduced to a small number of pure races is nonsense.³ And yet our social beliefs and practices are organized as if race were real.

Gender and Race as Mental Categories

Categories are essential to human thinking. In their absence, mental life would be overwhelmed by detail, language staggeringly complex, and communication virtually impossible.⁴ As far as experiencing and understanding social life are concerned, no categories are more important than gender and race. The capacity for classifying the social world in these terms emerges very early. Before children have command of language, they are able to make gender and race distinctions. By age three, children “know” whether they are a boy or a girl and whether they are white or black. Around the time they enter kindergarten, they have come to believe that gender and race are fixed and immutable. They understand differences between men and women and between whites and blacks as natural. Gender and race are now central to their sense of personal identity and central as well to how they think about others, tendencies they carry with them through the rest of their lives.⁵

Gender and Race as Sites of Durable Inequality

In the United States, as in other advanced industrial societies, individuals vary tremendously in wealth, power, and status. Inequality is generated in part by individual differences in talent and enterprise. It is generated in part by luck, good and bad. And it is generated in part by recurrent social processes, whereby different social groups are subject, again and again, over time and across situations, to systematically different treatment.

Over the course of American history, men and women and blacks and whites have often been singled out in this way. Indeed, gender and race are exemplary instances of what Charles Tilly calls “durable inequalities.” Tilly argues that differences in advantage that pivot on categorical opposites—male versus female, black versus white, Muslim versus Jew, citizen versus foreigner, Catholic versus Protestant—tend to be persistent. Durable inequality—inequality that lasts—depends heavily on the institutionalization of categorical pairs.⁶

In Tilly's theory, systems of enduring categorical inequality are established by two general processes. The first of these is *exploitation*, whereby members of a categorically bounded network command resources from which they draw significantly increased returns, accomplished by denying outsiders the full value of their efforts. Slavery provides an extreme example.⁷

Complementing exploitation is a second mechanism, *opportunity hoarding*, whereby members of a categorically bounded network gain control over a valued resource from which outsiders are excluded. Depending on time and place, hoarding might encompass high-paying jobs, good education, desirable neighborhoods, or any other valued resource.

Once established, categorical inequality is generalized by a process of *emulation*, whereby existing inequalities are transplanted from one setting to another. This can take place in labor markets when firms copy categorical inequalities established in other settings. Some firms assign certain jobs—high paying, promising advancement—to one group (say, whites), and assign other kinds of jobs—low paying, dead end—to another group (say, blacks). Other firms follow suit. Eventually the practice generates pools of workers with different experiences and different capabilities defined along group lines. Firms hire and promote accordingly. The result is categorical inequality entrenched within an entire industry.⁸

Inequality is locked into place through *adaptation*, whereby daily routines are organized around categorical distinctions. One variety is the invention of norms governing day-to-day interaction between members of categorically unequal groups, as in the extensive and intricate system of deference that grew up between blacks and whites in the Jim Crow south. Racial “etiquette” guided every detail of every encounter—forms of address, topics of conversation, appropriate demeanor, and more—thereby providing blacks and whites a regular reminder of the unbridgeable gulf that separated them.⁹

As categorical inequality spreads, participants invent stories about social group differences. Such stories are first and foremost boundary maintaining: they “embody shared understandings of who we are, who they are, what divides us, and what connects us.” Members of advantaged groups create what Elizabeth Anderson calls “stigmatizing stories.” Their purpose is to explain and rationalize inequality. In such stories, glaring differences between groups in wealth, power, and status are accounted for by corresponding differences between groups in talent, virtue, or culture.¹⁰

Today, of course, slavery is gone. The Jim Crow regime of racial oppression that followed emancipation has been dismantled. The 1964 Civil Rights Act made discrimination by race illegal, and surely it is neither as flagrant nor as pervasive today as it once was. But this does *not* mean that exploitation and opportunity hoarding along racial lines have disappeared. Evidence to the contrary is overwhelming.

African Americans still face discrimination in the labor market. African Americans looking to purchase homes are still steered away from white

neighborhoods and still subject to racial bias in mortgage lending. African Americans still endure racist epithets on the streets, harassment by police officers in public spaces, rudeness, excessive surveillance, and price discrimination while they shop, coolness from their teachers and bosses, and racist jokes from their co-workers.¹¹

More generally, in American society today, race and disadvantage remain closely inter-connected. Take the basic matter of health. Black women who bear children today are much less likely to lose an infant than were their parents and grandparents before them, but the infant mortality rate remains more than twice as high among blacks than among whites. Moreover, black children who survive their first year can look forward to poorer health, more illness, and a substantially shorter life, on average, than white children.¹²

Likewise, while African Americans made significant inroads into the middle class over the last fifty years, sharing in the economic prosperity that came to all of American society following World War II, racial differences remain and they are imposing. Blacks are twice as likely to be unemployed; they are substantially over-represented among “discouraged workers,” those who have given up looking for work and so do not appear in official unemployment figures; and when blacks are employed, they earn less. These differences are large, but they are nothing compared to racial differences in wealth. According to recent figures, the average white household commands more than *ten* times the financial assets of the average black household.¹³

Progress and inequality also characterize the domain of politics. Thanks to the heroic efforts of the Civil Rights Movement, black participation in political life towers over what it was a generation or two ago. And as a consequence of *that*, many blacks now hold positions of political authority.¹⁴ In 1965, the year of the Voting Rights Act, of the 435 elected officials serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, just four were black. Not a single black served in the Senate. Just three were mayors of American cities. In the entire country, fewer than 300 blacks held elected office, most as members of school boards, city councils, or state houses. A decade later the number of blacks holding elective office across the nation had increased more than tenfold. This sharp upward trend continued through the 1970s, but now is leveling off—and leveling off well below strict proportionality. African Americans make up roughly 13 percent of the voting age population in the United States, but they comprise less than 2 percent of elected officials. Blacks have made impressive gains in politics—illustrated most dramatically by Barack Obama’s election in 2008—but taken all around, black Americans remain substantially underrepresented.¹⁵

In Tilly’s theory, remember, differences in advantage that pivot on categorical opposites are especially likely to endure. According to Tilly, “paired and unequal categories do crucial organizational work, producing marked, durable differences in access to valued resources. Durable inequality depends heavily on the institutionalization of categorical pairs.”¹⁶ Race qualifies in this

respect, but so, too, does gender. Indeed, the categorical distinction between men and women is no doubt the oldest and most durable of social distinctions. All human societies engender the social world. Everywhere, women do more of the “tending, cooking, cleaning, clothing, washing, nurturing, and otherwise caring for people.” Societies vary tremendously in how sharply they are stratified by gender, of course. In the contemporary United States, men generally amass more wealth, exercise greater power, and enjoy higher status than women.¹⁷

Parallels between gender and race in this respect are striking. In the first place, for most of American history, women were denied first-class citizenship. Full voting rights did not come to American women until 1920 with ratification of the 19th Amendment. In the 1930s about one half the states still denied married women ownership of their wages. Not until 1979 did sexual harassment become a serious legal concept. And not until 1984 did courts find it possible for rape to take place within marriage. Domestic violence, sexual abuse, rape, prostitution, and pornography remain commonplace features of contemporary American life. All this can be read as evidence of women’s subordinate place.¹⁸

Economic inequality in gender relations in the United States has been generated and maintained principally by separating men and women into distinctive occupational structures. Over most of American history, this separation was accomplished by assigning women to work inside the household and men to work outside the household. After the turn of the twentieth century, increasing numbers of women entered the paid labor force, but as they did so they were steered away from positions of influence and authority. Stenographer, typist, secretary, and filing clerk became women’s jobs; supervisor, manager, partner, and professional were reserved for men.¹⁹

Over the last thirty years, gender’s role in the structure, organization, and operation of the labor market has diminished. Women now constitute nearly one-half of the U.S. labor force. The gap in earnings between men and women is narrowing. Educational and employment opportunities for women are opening up. But economic inequalities between men and women still exist. Under current trajectories, they will not disappear anytime soon.²⁰

A final parallel we will draw between race and gender has to do with politics. We’ve already noted that full voting rights were not extended to American women until 1920. In the immediate aftermath of the 19th Amendment’s ratification, differences in participation between men and women were enormous. Now they are negligible. Today, on such matters as turning out to vote, working on a campaign, serving on a local governing board, or attending a public meeting, women take part nearly as often, and sometimes more often, than men.²¹

With increases in political participation have come increases in political power. In 1974, Jeane Kirkpatrick began her groundbreaking study of female state legislators with this crisp assertion:

Half a century after the ratification of the nineteenth amendment, no woman has been nominated to be president or vice president, no woman has served on the Supreme Court. Today, there is no woman in the cabinet, no woman serving as governor of a major state, no woman mayor of a major city, no woman in the top leadership of either major party.²²

Things have changed. Over the last thirty years, women have made dramatic progress in securing positions of political authority. But, as in the case of race, so, too, for gender, progress toward full equality on this front has recently slowed. Despite impressive gains, women—like African Americans—remain substantially underrepresented in the halls of power.²³

Gender and Race in Society

As norms and practices, gender and race are made by society. As mental categories, gender and race are important and consequential features of how we think about ourselves and others. As sites for discrimination and exclusion, gender and race remain prime examples of durable inequality. In all these important respects, gender and race are alike.

Gender and race are not alike in all respects, however. Most significantly for our purposes here, gender and race differ from one another in their social organization. Gender and race are “made” by society, but they are made in very different ways. The social organization of gender emphasizes intimacy; the social organization of race emphasizes separation.

For analytic purposes, it is useful, as Goffman points out, to distinguish between two kinds of disadvantaged groups: “those that can and tend to be sequestered off into entire families and neighborhoods and those that do not.” Women belong to the latter category. Women are not segregated into enclaves—but neither are they scattered haphazardly through the social structure. On the contrary, women “are allocated distributively to households in the form of female children, and then later, but still distributively, to other households in the form of wives.” Women spend much of their lives in intimate relationships with men: with fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons.²⁴

Things are very different for race. A persistent feature of race relations in the United States is spatial segregation. Despite federal fair housing legislation passed in 1968, the United States remains today, in many respects, a segregated society. In neighborhoods across the country, blacks and whites are separated more completely now than they were 100 years ago. In a typical major American city at the close of the twentieth century, nearly 80 percent of the black population would need to pick up and move into new neighborhoods in order to achieve racial balance in the city as a whole. And if neighborhoods continue, by and large, to reflect the color-line, then so do other important American institutions: schools, churches, work, and marriage.²⁵

Because gender and race are central to how Americans think about social life, and because gender and race are sites of persistent and serious inequality in America, we expect both to figure importantly into public opinion. Because gender and race—men and women, whites and blacks—are organized so differently in American society, we expect gender and race to figure differently into public opinion. Let's see.

Gender, Race, and Political Parties

At the center of American politics are political parties, long-lasting coalitions among politicians, interest groups, activists, and donors. Through elections, parties seek control of government in order to further coalition goals: to extend affirmative action, say, or to end it; to legalize abortion or to prohibit it. With such goals in mind, parties recruit candidates and supply them with the money, expertise, and labor they need to win public office.²⁶

As parties are central to American politics, party identification is central to how ordinary citizens think about political life. Most Americans identify themselves as Democrats or as Republicans, and this is not a casual thing. Party identification is a standing decision, a “durable attachment, not readily disturbed by passing events and personalities.” Nor is party identification inconsequential:

To the average person, the affairs of government are remote and complex, and yet the average citizen is asked periodically to formulate opinions about these affairs.... In this dilemma, having the party symbol stamped on certain candidates, certain issue positions, certain interpretations of reality is of great psychological convenience.²⁷

Our first question for public opinion, then, is what do gender and race have to do with party identification? A general analysis of the relationship between social groups and political parties is set out by Lipset and Rokkan in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967). There, Lipset and Rokkan trace the origins of social groups relevant to politics back to the “two revolutions”—the national and the industrial—that mark the onset of modernity. The rise of the nation state, Lipset and Rokkan argue, generated a pair of conflicts of continuing relevance to politics: one that opposed the nation-building center against the ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse subject populations in the provinces; the other that set the state against the church. According to Lipset and Rokkan, the conflicts arising from the national revolution primarily concerned moral values and cultural identities. The industrial revolution gave rise to conflict between economic interests. The expansion of markets and the rapid spread of new technologies opened up new and enduring cleavages: first between landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs; and later between owners and employers on the one side and tenants and workers on the other.

The generation of distinctive interests associated with particular social groups encourages alignments to form between those groups and the political parties. A key point here is that once established, such alignments persist. The party system tends to “lock in” conflict between groups.²⁸

The alignment between social groups and political parties is durable, as Lipset and Rokkan say, but it is not permanent. There is perhaps no clearer illustration of this point than that provided by race in the United States.

We pick up this story with the rising of the Civil Rights Movement, which became visible nationally for the first time through simple acts of civil disobedience carried out as protest against segregation in a handful of southern towns. Marches, demonstrations, “freedom rides,” and voter registration efforts soon followed, eventually triggering massive resistance in the Deep South and, finally, action from the federal government. In July of 1964, after the longest legislative debate in the history of the U.S. Congress, President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act into law. Arguably the greatest legislative achievement of the Civil Rights Movement and the most important domestic legislation of the postwar era, the Civil Rights Act made possible rapid and dramatic declines in racial segregation of public places, opened up employment opportunities for black Americans, and laid the groundwork for enforcement of the Supreme Court’s historic 1954 decision on school desegregation.²⁹

The Civil Rights Act also became part of the 1964 presidential campaign, thanks in no small measure to Senator Goldwater’s success in capturing the Republican Party’s presidential nomination. In his campaign, Goldwater argued against the encroachments of the federal government in general and against the civil rights legislation sponsored by the Johnson administration in particular. As he made his case, Goldwater moved the Republican Party decisively to the right on matters of race, just as Johnson hauled the Democratic Party to the left. The result, in the short run, was a Republican catastrophe. Outside the Deep South, Goldwater carried only his home state of Arizona and was buried under a landslide of historic proportions.

As is often the case, the long run was a different and more complicated affair. After his lop-sided victory, Johnson created a flurry of new programs as part of a War on Poverty. He engineered passage of the Voting Rights Act. He established the Department of Housing and Urban Development, putting in place for the first time the capacity to develop and carry out an urban policy, and appointed Robert Weaver as its secretary, the first black cabinet member in United States history. Johnson pressed for and eventually obtained legislation to prohibit discrimination in the housing market, through the Fair Housing Act of 1968. And he appointed Thurgood Marshall to the Supreme Court, the ninety-sixth Justice and the first black, some twenty-five years after Marshall had argued the Brown school desegregation case.

Here (finally), is the relevant point: the Johnson–Goldwater contest and the liberal initiatives that shortly followed precipitated a massive and rapid

shift in party allegiances. African Americans moved almost unanimously into the Democratic Party, while white southerners began to move out. The net result, shown in Figure 7.1, was the emergence of a huge racial divide in partisanship.

A huge and *persistent* racial divide: since Johnson's presidency, party differences over matters of race—over school desegregation, anti-poverty programs, crime, welfare reform, and affirmative action—have remained. Black Americans have continued to vote in overwhelming numbers for Democratic candidates. Southern whites have continued to vote for Republican candidates. And the south, for 100 years solidly Democratic, is now a Republican stronghold.³⁰

The story of gender and the party system is similar in some respects, but, as we'll see, comes to a much less dramatic conclusion. In the first decades of the twentieth century, the prospect of extending the franchise to women generated a lively debate over the possibility of a "women's vote." Feminists hoped that newly enfranchised women voters would support candidates promoting "maternalist" social policies: protective labor laws or government subsidy of health and housing. For their part, professional politicians doubted that women would coalesce behind one of the parties—and they turned out to be right. Ratification of the 19th Amendment gave women the vote, but the parties undertook only modest and probably off-setting measures to appeal to women, and no distinctive women's vote materialized.³¹




Figure 7.1 The Racial Divide in Partisanship 1952–2008 (source: American National Election Studies).

Not until the rising of the modern women's movement—the second wave of feminism—were gender issues again pushed onto the national agenda. In 1963, the President's Commission on the Status of Women issued its report documenting serious inequalities at work and before the law. In the same year Congress passed the Equal Pay Act, outlawing different pay for women and men doing the same work. Betty Friedan's *Feminine Mystique*, urging women into careers and public life, also appeared in 1963. The following year passage of the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, or (as an afterthought) sex. In 1966, the National Organization for Women came into being, providing women with organizational representation in Washington and some assurance that the new laws would be enforced.³²

Suddenly there were press conferences, meetings, protests, marches, and demonstrations. More and more women declared themselves sympathetic to feminism, enlisted in feminist organizations, and ran for public office. Hearings on women's rights became commonplace in Congress. Women's rights became a salient subject in national party platforms and conventions. Bills representing various aspects of the women's rights agenda were routinely introduced and very often passed. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), promising that "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex," sailed through both houses of Congress. This (apparent) triumph was followed in short order by *Roe v. Wade* (1973), the Supreme Court's ruling that efforts to regulate abortion by the states were unconstitutional.³³

For many socially conservative Americans, "the ERA and abortion symbolized everything about feminism worth opposing." Conservatives organized, entered the political fray, and often won. They blocked state ratification of the ERA, and through persuasion, pressure, litigation, and in some cases intimidation, placed restrictions on abortion.³⁴

The political struggle over women's rights and roles is ongoing. The point we wish to emphasize here is that, increasingly, the fight takes place *between* the political parties. Over the last forty years or so, the two parties have staked out distinctive positions on gender. The Democratic Party has embraced feminist ideas. In turn, the Republican Party has welcomed the conservative reaction to feminism. This polarization of the parties over gender is apparent in all sorts of ways: in party platforms, roll-call votes in the House and in the Senate, in sponsorship of legislation, in ratings of Members of Congress by relevant interest groups, in the views expressed by delegates to the national party conventions, in presidential campaigns, and in State of the Union addresses. The polarization is especially pronounced on abortion. In the early 1970s, the Democratic and Republican congressional delegations were more or less indistinguishable on abortion. No longer. The typical Democratic Member of Congress now takes a strong pro-choice position; the typical Republican Member of Congress is now ardently pro-life.³⁵

In short, over the course of the last several decades, the Democratic and Republican parties have shifted their positions on gender, just as they have on race. The Democratic Party moved to the left; the Republican Party moved to the right. The question then is this: in response to these changes in what the parties were offering, did men move to the Republican Party while women moved to the Democratic Party, in effect retracing the steps taken by whites and blacks over matters of race? And the answer, shown in Figure 7.2, is: not really.

As Figure 7.2 reveals, men's and women's partisan movement over matters of gender is nowhere near as clear and decisive as blacks' and whites' partisan movement over matters of race. There is evidence in Figure 7.2 of an emerging gender gap in partisanship, but a modest one. During the Eisenhower administration, women were actually slightly more likely than men, not less, to identify with the Republican Party. By the early 1970s this difference was reversed. For some time now, women have been some eight to ten percentage points more likely than men to identify as Democrats.³⁶

The contrast between gender and race here is dramatic. This is surprising. We expected that the relationship between gender and party, on the one side, and race and party, on the other, would be the same. Both, we thought, would be governed by the same principle: namely, that when the political parties change position on an important issue decisively, and maintain that change persistently, ordinary citizens will adjust their partisan allegiances accordingly. In the case of race, we expected African Americans would move in one




Figure 7.2 The Gender Gap in Partisanship 1952–2008 (source: American National Election Studies).

direction and white Americans would move in the opposite direction. Likewise, in the case of gender, we expected that men would go one way while women went the other. This is not what we find.

Our expectation, notice, was based on two parallel assumptions: first, that blacks and whites differ in their interests, opinions, and aspirations on matters of race, and so will gravitate naturally to one party or the other when the parties offer a real choice; and second, that men and women differ in their interests, opinions, and aspirations over gender, and so will gravitate naturally to one party or the other when presented with a real choice. As we'll see next, the first assumption is (more or less) right, but the second is not.

Gender Gap, Racial Divide

In this section we focus on public opinion on matters of policy: what Americans say that the government should do about pressing national problems. Here we are especially interested in the possibility of differences between men and women on issues of gender, and differences between blacks and whites on issues of race.

Table 7.1 presents a small but representative sampling of findings, taken from the 2008 American National Election Study. The results shown there are about as clear as public opinion findings get. Differences between men and women on policy in the domain of gender are tiny. Women are a bit more likely to support abortion rights than men, and a bit more likely to support increased federal spending on childcare. The overwhelming pattern is similarity. In contrast, differences between African Americans and whites on policy in the domain of race are enormous. Blacks are much more likely to support government prohibiting racial discrimination than whites, and much more likely to support affirmative action in hiring and promotion. What stands out in the case of race is difference.

Table 7.1 Opinion of Men and Women on Gender versus Opinion of Whites and Blacks on Race (percentage supporting the liberal option)

| <i>Gender</i> | | | |
|------------------------|--------|---------------------------|--------|
| <i>Abortion rights</i> | | <i>Childcare spending</i> | |
| Women | Men | Women | Men |
| 62 | 59 | 75 | 72 |
| <i>Race</i> | | | |
| <i>Fair employment</i> | | <i>Affirmative action</i> | |
| White | Blacks | Whites | Blacks |
| 47 | 76 | 17 | 57 |

Source: 2008 American National Election Study.

The pattern shown in Table 7.1 is utterly general. Whatever the exact policy, differences between men and women on policy in the domain of gender are negligible, while differences between blacks and whites on policy in the domain of race are enormous. Tiny gender gaps and huge racial divides on matters of gender and race are the rule.³⁷

Why are differences between men and women in politics so muted? The principal cause, we think, goes back to social organization. In the typical case, women spend much of their lives in intimate relationships with men: with fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons. This means both that women are cut off from their own kind in significant ways, and that they acquire interests and values in common with the men whose lives they share. Women, as Simone de Beauvoir once put it,

have no past, no history, no religion of their own; and they have no such solidarity of work and interest as that of the proletariat. They are not even promiscuously herded together in the way that creates community feeling among the American Negroes, the ghetto Jews, the workers of Saint-Denis, or the factory hands of Renault. They live dispersed among the males, attached through residence, housework, economic conditions and social standing to certain men—fathers or husbands—more firmly than they are attached to other women.³⁸

Women and African Americans as Objects of Identification

If mere membership in social groups is sometimes sufficient to generate differences of opinion on matters of policy, the political consequences of group membership are typically accentuated among those who belong to the group psychologically, or, as we will say, who *identify* with their group. Group identification comes in two main varieties. Common fate refers to the extent to which individuals believe that their life chances and outcomes are intertwined with the opportunities and experiences of their group, that what happens to their group, will happen to them. Those highly identified with their group on grounds of common fate will come to a political choice with their group's interests prominently in mind. A second variety of group identification is grounded in emotional interdependence, occurring when individuals feel close to their group, experiencing pride when other group members do well and anger when they are treated unfairly. Emotional interdependence reflects the expressive side of politics. To the degree Americans derive their sense of self from their membership in social groups, political choices become acts of affirmation and solidarity.³⁹

People vary in the degree to which they identify with a group. For some group members, attachment is effectively zero; for others, identification with a social group constitutes a central aspect of identity; and there exist all shades

in between. Strength of identification is a sign of a person's priorities. The stronger the identification, the more powerful the political consequences of group membership will be.⁴⁰

This is an altogether general claim, and as you might expect by now, it applies more readily to race than to gender. Our findings on this point come from a pair of surveys undertaken in the fall of 2000, one in Atlanta, the other in Detroit. In each city, we questioned equal numbers of whites and blacks and equal numbers of women and men, more than 2,000 people in all. We assessed group identification with a series of standard questions, tapping both forms of identification (common fate and emotional interdependence). Women were asked how much they thought their own fate was tied up with the fate of women in general; whether they felt close to women; how often they felt pride over the accomplishments of women; and how often they felt angry about the way women were treated. A parallel series of questions was posed to African Americans about their group.

On each of these measures, African Americans were much more likely to identify with their race than women were with their gender. For example, 40 percent of African Americans reported that they often felt angry over how blacks were treated in American society, compared to just 21 percent of women saying the same about society's treatment of women. Furthermore, racial group identification turned out to be a more powerful force influencing opinions on matters of race policy among African Americans than was gender group identification as a force influencing opinions on matters of gender among women. African Americans who strongly identified with their race were more likely to push for integration of the public schools, for affirmative action in the workplace, and for increased foreign aid to African nations, compared to African Americans who claimed no such identification. In contrast, women who strongly identified with their gender were sometimes more likely to support women's issues but sometimes not. They were more likely to favor equal pay for equal work but no more likely to endorse the pro-choice position on abortion than were women who were psychologically less attached to their gender.⁴¹

In sum, group identification appears to be both more prevalent among African Americans *and* more potent. Why? The social organization of gender emphasizes intimacy between men and women; the social organization of race emphasizes separation between whites and blacks. Separation fosters solidarity among African Americans. Integration impairs solidarity among women.

Women and African Americans as Objects of Attitude

Now we turn from in-group to out-group, from feelings of solidarity among one's own kind to attitudes of resentment or condescension directed at others.

We have known for some time that attitudes toward out-groups can powerfully influence the views Americans take on particular matters of public policy. The argument behind this empirical regularity is straightforward. It goes like this. Policy is complicated. The arguments are hard to follow. It is unclear what will really work. Under these conditions, many Americans may happily forego careful analysis of a policy's merits and instead decide what their opinion is according to how they feel about the groups implicated in the policy. According to this logic, support for tightening welfare benefits derives from hostility toward the poor; opposition to government action against AIDS turns on contempt for homosexuals; resistance to immigration reflects suspicions that the new immigrants are somehow un-American. Attitude toward out-groups is not the only force driving opinion in these various policy disputes, but it is always present, and of all the forces that shape opinion, it is often the most powerful.⁴²

Does this argument apply to opinion in the domains of gender and race? Yes—though successful application requires taking into account, once again, differences in how gender and race are organized in society.

By attitude toward women we mean this: belief about the proper place of women in contemporary society—where women belong, and where they do not. For at least 100 years, public discussions over gender have been preoccupied with this one overriding question: whether women's primary, or even exclusive, responsibilities should lie in the private sphere of home and family. Politicians, activists, intellectuals, and religious leaders have all had something to say about women's place. The traditional position holds that women belong, properly and naturally, to the private sphere of home and family; that their fragile and delicate natures must be protected from the heat and grime and rough and tumble world of work; that their mission, ordained by biology if not by God, is to support their husbands and nurture their children.

This view came under intense and public challenge by the modern women's movement. For the first time, Americans in visible numbers began to question the notion that men and women were essentially and fundamentally different, and that society must be organized to the last detail to harmonize with this fundamental fact of nature. Perhaps women were equal in talent and ambition to men and could make significant contributions outside the home.

To capture differences over women's place, we have drawn upon research done by Janet Spence and her Attitude toward Women Scale (AWS), developed in the early 1970s. AWS is a measure of beliefs about women's roles, rights, and responsibilities. The scale puts front and center the traditional view of the family, in which the husband works in the world and the wife maintains the home. The particular questions we use to measure beliefs about women's proper place are presented in Table 7.2. As shown there, some of the questions are about where women and men

belong (e.g., “It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family”). Some, going further, propose that the traditional division of labor between men and women is a direct reflection of differences in their underlying essences (“Men are naturally better-suited to the world of work than women are”).⁴³

Table 7.2 suggests that the traditional notion of women’s place is no longer taken for granted. The traditional position has many defenders, but at least as many opponents. Notice also that the questions displayed in Table 7.2 make no attempt to directly assess hostility toward women. To do so would be a mistake from our perspective, for it would ignore the distinctive social arrangement of gender. Gender is characterized by intimacy and interdependence. Intimacy and interdependence generate complicated feelings. Men depend on women for affection, pleasure, and descendants. Women are revered for their role as mothers and counted on for their kindness. Resistance to change in the status quo in gender relations is expressed not through resentful feelings and denigrating stereotypes, but through beliefs aimed at keeping women in their (natural) place.⁴⁴

If we are trying to understand opposition to women’s issues, outright hostility toward women should play a minor part. More important in fueling opposition to family leave or abortion rights should be a conviction about social order, a conviction that women’s proper place is the home. This turns out to be so. Men who subscribe to the traditional view of women’s place tend to oppose a wide range of progressive initiatives in the domain of gender. These effects are especially strong for policies that entail changes in roles: for example, on whether women in the military should be permitted to serve in combat.⁴⁵

The social organization of race is characterized by separation. Separation, in the presence of inequality, is a breeding ground for stereotyping and denigration. The particular variety of racial stereotyping and denigration prominent in American society today emerged out of the post-Civil Rights era. Its principal theme is that blacks fail to take advantage of the ample opportunities provided them in a society that is now blind to color. Freed from discrimination and segregation, African Americans choose idleness over work, crime over honest labor, promiscuity over restraint and responsibility, and alcohol and drugs over sobriety.⁴⁶

A measure of racial resentment (as we will call it) is presented in Table 7.3, taken from the January 2008 component of the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP). As the table reveals, substantial numbers of whites agree that if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites or that the best way for blacks to solve their problems is to stop complaining and get to work. Likewise, many whites reject the proposition that blacks must settle for jobs below what they deserve or that blacks still face substantial discrimination on account of their race. Taken together, responses to these

Table 7.2 Men's View of Women's Place (%)

| | |
|---|------|
| <i>A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 15.6 |
| Agree | 20.2 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 11.9 |
| Disagree | 36.0 |
| Disagree strongly | 16.3 |
| <i>It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 10.9 |
| Agree | 22.6 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 29.7 |
| Disagree | 19.6 |
| Disagree strongly | 17.3 |
| <i>As a general rule, when a couple gets divorced, their children should go live with their mother.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 5.3 |
| Agree | 11.1 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 36.6 |
| Disagree | 25.2 |
| Disagree strongly | 21.8 |
| <i>Men are naturally better suited to the world of work than women are.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 7.3 |
| Agree | 20.3 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 27.5 |
| Disagree | 24.3 |
| Disagree strongly | 20.6 |
| <i>When it comes to the care of children, women are just naturally better than men.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 13.4 |
| Agree | 40.2 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 19.9 |
| Disagree | 14.8 |
| Disagree strongly | 11.8 |
| <i>It's fine for a husband to stay home to take care of home and family instead of working outside the home.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 6.5 |
| Agree | 5.2 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 18.4 |
| Disagree | 43.1 |
| Disagree strongly | 26.8 |

Source: 2007–2008 CCAP.

Note

Number of cases: 512.

Table 7.3 White Attitudes toward Blacks (%)

| | |
|---|------|
| <i>Irish, Italians, Jews, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 42.4 |
| Agree | 28.1 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 14.5 |
| Disagree | 10.2 |
| Disagree strongly | 4.7 |
| <i>Even today, government officials usually pay more attention to a complaint from a white person than from a black person.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 7.9 |
| Agree | 21.9 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 19.0 |
| Disagree | 27.4 |
| Disagree strongly | 23.8 |
| <i>If blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 17.0 |
| Agree | 28.3 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 27.0 |
| Disagree | 17.0 |
| Disagree strongly | 10.7 |
| <i>When it comes to good jobs and decent salaries, most blacks still end up with less than they deserve.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 6.1 |
| Agree | 27.0 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 25.8 |
| Disagree | 25.3 |
| Disagree strongly | 15.8 |
| <i>In America today, blacks still face plenty of discrimination because of their race.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 15.4 |
| Agree | 40.4 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 15.5 |
| Disagree | 17.9 |
| Disagree strongly | 10.7 |
| <i>Blacks face real problems, but the way to solve these problems is to stop complaining and get to work.</i> | |
| Agree strongly | 30.7 |
| Agree | 35.4 |
| Neither agree nor disagree | 16.8 |
| Disagree | 11.7 |
| Disagree strongly | 5.5 |

Source: CCAP 2007–2008.

Note

Number of cases: 865.

various propositions allow us to distinguish between those whites who are generally sympathetic toward blacks from those who are generally unsympathetic, who resent the failure of blacks, as they see it, to demonstrate the virtues of self-reliance and hard work.

Such differences turn out to be politically consequential. Racial resentment strongly predicts white opinion on school integration, fair employment, foreign aid to Africa, federal support for Head Start, affirmative action in hiring and promotion decisions, and much more. Of course, opinion on such matters is not a reflection of racial resentment alone. But among the standard explanations of public opinion—party identification, several varieties of contemporary conservatism, age and education—none is more important than racial resentment.⁴⁷

Political Activation of Gender and Race

Americans belong to many social groups at once. They are simultaneously black or white or brown; Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or atheist; male or female; bankers or carpenters; urbanites or suburbanites; Southerners or Yankees; and so on. This means that Americans have available, in principle at least, an extensive repertoire out of which to create an identity. In parallel fashion, Americans possess attitudes toward many social groups—towards Catholics, women, bankers, and more—any number of which could be relevant to their political opinions.

Which aspects of identity and attitude become important—which are *activated*—depends on political circumstances. More precisely, activation depends on the clarity of group cues. Some issues clearly evoke social group memberships and attitudes (e.g., affirmative action in college admissions); others do not (e.g., rebuilding infrastructure).

To illustrate this point, consider public opinion on federal support for early education. Respondents to a national survey were asked for their opinions on “spending more money on the schools in *black* neighborhoods, especially for pre-school and early education programs” or they were asked for their opinions on “spending more money on the schools in *poor* neighborhoods, especially for pre-school and early education programs.” The proposal is identical in each case but for the intended beneficiaries: black children in the first case, poor children in the second. This one difference has major consequences. When government policy is targeted on black children, the racial divide in opinion doubles in size (compared to opinion on early education for poor children); black support increases slightly; white support declines dramatically; and the effect of racial resentment on white opposition to federal support of early education increases substantially. When policies and programs explicitly designed to provide assistance to black Americans are put before the public, racial considerations are activated.⁴⁸

Clarity of group cues depends not only on the issue itself, but on how the issue is framed. The issues that government take up are always complex; they are always subject to alternative interpretations. For example, what exactly is affirmative action? Who is it for? Is it quotas or outreach? Is it reverse discrimination? Is it compensation for the injustices of the past? Activists and partisans are constantly trying to frame issues in ways that will advance their cause, hoping that others, including the general public, will find their framings persuasive. Which frames prevail among elites affect how citizens understand the issue, and, in the end, what their opinions on the issue turn out to be.⁴⁹

The importance of frames for activation is illustrated in an experiment on public opinion on affirmative action. In a national survey, Americans were asked for their views on affirmative action in college admissions, posed in one of two ways. For half the sample, affirmative action was framed this way: "Some people say that because of past discrimination, it is sometimes necessary for colleges and universities to reserve openings for black students. Others oppose quotas because they say quotas *discriminate against whites*." The other half of the sample was presented with affirmative action framed this way: "Some people say that because of past discrimination, it is sometimes necessary for colleges and universities to reserve openings for black students. Others oppose quotas because they say quotas *give blacks advantages they haven't earned*." All respondents were then asked whether they were for or against quotas to admit black students.

In both versions of the question, it is suggested affirmative action might be supported on the grounds that such policies are necessary to overcome past discrimination. The questions differ in that one version suggests that affirmative action might be opposed because such policies constitute discrimination against whites (the reverse discrimination frame), while the other version suggests that affirmative action might be opposed because such policies give to blacks advantages they have not earned (the unfair advantage frame).

It turns out that framing opposition to affirmative action in terms of advantages to blacks that they do not deserve evokes white Americans' racial feelings powerfully. Racial resentment is a much more powerful factor in white opinion on affirmative action when the issue is framed in this way. Put the other way around, the impact of racial resentment diminishes dramatically when affirmative action is framed as reverse discrimination. This is an important result. It suggests that even on controversial issues that are transparently and obviously about race, racial resentment need not play a dominant role in white public opinion. It depends on how the issue is framed.⁵⁰

Implications

Gender and race are central to how people think about social life; both are "made" by society; and as sites for discrimination and exclusion, both have

been and continue to be good illustrations of durable inequality. In all these important respects, gender and race are alike. They differ in social organization—in the characteristic ways that men and women, on the one hand, and blacks and whites, on the other, experience one another. The social organization of gender emphasizes intimacy, the social organization of race emphasizes separation, and this difference, we have argued, has important implications for the roles that gender and race play in American public opinion. Intimacy impairs group solidarity among women and interferes with hostility between men and women. Separation encourages group solidarity among African Americans and encourages hostility between whites and blacks.

Shortly before we began to work on this chapter, a quite remarkable natural experiment was coming to a close. In the contest for the 2008 Democratic Party's presidential nomination, the two principal rivals were, of course, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. Heading into the race, Senator Clinton was the odds-on favorite. She enjoyed the backing of her party, endorsements from prominent African Americans, money to burn, and what appeared to be a commanding lead over all rivals. But, as we know, in a tight and fiercely contested race, Obama eventually secured the nomination, and then went on in the fall to be elected president of the United States.

If, as we say, the activation of identity and attitude depends on the clarity of group cues, then the 2008 contest for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination offers up a tantalizing and important additional test of the findings we have presented here. Senator Clinton made gender salient in exactly the same unequivocal way that Barack Obama made race salient—by embodying it.

As it happens, analysis of voters' reactions to Clinton and Obama yield the familiar results. Obama's campaign elicited a huge racial divide; Clinton's campaign produced a modest gender gap. African Americans expressed more solidarity with their group than women did with theirs. Racial solidarity was more powerful in building support for Obama than gender solidarity was in building support for Clinton. Traditional notions of women's proper place made some trouble for Clinton. Racial resentment among whites undermined support for Obama. In short, the claims we have made about gender and race seem to have been borne out in a most consequential practical case.⁵¹

A broader lesson of our chapter is the reminder that public opinion is a reflection, in part, of historical processes. Social movements come onto the political scene, new groups of voters are enfranchised, political parties modify their platforms in order to win elections, new candidates, with visible connections to certain social groups, are nominated. In the face of such changes, voters alter their views and adjust their political loyalties. Relations that we may think of as fixed—African Americans are Democrats, Republicans are anti-abortion—are not. Things change. Social movements, new voters, political parties, and fresh candidates are significant participants in the "dance" of public opinion.

This makes forecasting difficult. It would be foolish to predict the future course of gender and race and public opinion—and we won't try. But we will suggest, by way of closing, two factors that any sensible forecast should take into account.

The first is inequality. As pointed out in the first part of the chapter, the quality of life experienced by black Americans has improved notably over the last fifty years, but racial inequalities persist in many important domains of life. In some instances, the differences are actually increasing. The corresponding story for gender is quite different. By comparison to race, inequalities between men and women are less extreme and they appear to be narrowing relatively rapidly. Should this pattern continue into the future, the conclusion we have drawn here—that in the contemporary United States, race plays a more prominent role in public opinion than gender—is likely to continue to hold.

A second factor to consider concerns social organization. A central feature of American race relations is separation. Despite the efforts of the Civil Rights Movement and the intent of national legislation, the United States remains today, in many respects, a segregated society. We see this in neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, churches, and marriages. All true. But what is also true is that segregation is declining, if slowly and fitfully. Neighborhoods are less segregated than they were thirty years ago. Marrying across racial lines is still rare, but less rare than it was a generation ago. Insofar as these trends continue, the power of race to organize political conflict should diminish.⁵²

One last point to keep in mind: inequality and segregation have something in common. Both are products, in part, of decisions made in politics. As such, inequality and segregation illustrate well the general doctrine that politics matters: that policies have material consequences for the lives its citizens lead. In a democratic political system, what the future brings for gender and race depends in an important way on what we decide to do.

Notes

1. As we say, research on public opinion that centers on gender *or* on race is booming, but research that takes up gender *and* race together is quite rare. Throughout our chapter, we compare the role of gender and the role of race in contemporary American public opinion, motivated by the intuition that a systematic comparison between the two will turn out to be informative about both. By race we mean the distinction between white (non-Hispanic white) and black (non-Hispanic black). Things are more complicated than that, of course. The chapter by Junn, Mendelberg, and Czaja in this volume takes up the increasingly multi-racial character of American society.
2. Goffman, Erving. 1977. The arrangement between the sexes. *Theory and Society* 4(3): 301–331.
3. Lewontin, Richard. 1995. *Human Diversity*. New York: Scientific American Library.
4. On the indispensability of categories, see Margolis, Eric, and Stephen Laurence.

1999. *Concepts: Core Readings*. Cambridge: MIT Press; Smith, Edward E., and Douglas Medin. 1981. *Categories and Concepts*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5. See, for example Gelman, Susan A. 2003. *The Essential Child: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought*. New York: Oxford University Press; Hirschfeld, Lawrence A. 1996. *Race in the Making: Cognition, Culture, and the Child's Construction of Human Kinds*. Cambridge: MIT Press; Maccoby, Eleanor E. 1998. *The Two Sexes: Growing Up Apart. Coming Together*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and Ruble, D.N., and C.L. Martin. 2000. Gender development. In *Handbook of Child Psychology*, W. Damon and N. Eisenberg (editors). New York: Wiley. Pp. 933–1016.
 6. Tilly, Charles. 1998. *Durable Inequality*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
 7. Beginning in the early part of the seventeenth century, West Africans were taken forcibly from their homelands and shipped under nightmarish conditions to the southern colonies. They came first in a trickle and then in a flood. By the time of the first U.S. Census in 1790, African Americans—nearly all slave—made up roughly 20 percent of the national population and more than one-third of the population of the south. Slavery, imposed and maintained by violence, was at the center of the new American economic order (Berlin, Ira. 1998. *Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America*. Cambridge: Belknap Press; Farley, Reynolds, and Walter R. Allen. 1987. *The Color Line and the Quality of Life in America*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation).
 8. This example comes from Anderson, Elizabeth, 2010. *The Imperative of Integration*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 9.
 9. See Dollard, John. 1937. *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row, pp. 606–618; and Litwack, Leon F. 1961. *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
 10. Quotation is from Tilly (1998, p. 63). Anderson (2010, pp. 19–20). According to Tilly, exploitation, opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation are responsible for establishing and then maintaining *all* the multifarious varieties of durable inequalities that modern societies display. Tilly goes too far, and on three fronts. He claims to explain *all* durable inequalities. He insists that *most* of differences in advantage are due to categorical inequalities. And, most important from our point of view, he fails to appreciate the direct role stigmatizing stories can play in the generation and maintenance of inequality through democratic processes—through public pressure and fair elections.
 11. See Ayres, Ian. 2001. *Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gender Discrimination*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; Kirschenman, Joleen, and Kathryn M. Neckerman. 1991; “We’d love to hire them, but...”: The meaning of race for employers. In *The Urban Underclass*, Christopher Jencks and Paul E. Peterson (editors). Washington, DC: Brookings; and Ross, Steven L., and John Yinger. 2002. *The Color of Credit*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Furthermore, Quillian, Lincoln. 2006. New approaches to understanding racial prejudice and discrimination. *Annual Review of Sociology* 32(1): 299–328 provides an excellent review of studies of racial discrimination.
 12. As of 2007, the average white person could expect to live 78.4 years while the average black person could expect to live 73.6 years (Xu, J., K. Kochanek, S. Murphy, and B. Tejada-Vera. 2010. Deaths: Final data for 2007. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf). On race and health and well-being more generally, see Farley, Reynolds. 2008. The Kerner Commission plus four

- decades: What has changed? What has not? Unpublished paper, Center for Population Research, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan; Farley and Allen (1987); Sandefur, Gary D., Molly Martin, Jennifer Eggerling-Boeck, Susan E. Mannon, and Ann M. Meir. 2001. An overview of racial and ethnic demographic trends. In *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, Volume I, Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (editors). Washington, DC: National Academy Press; and Williams, David R. 2001. Racial variation in adult health status: Patterns, paradoxes, and prospects. In *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, Volume II, Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (editors). Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
13. The literature on racial differences in economic status is enormous. For an introduction, see Blank, Rebecca M. 2001. An overview of trends in social and economic well-being, by race. In *America Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences*, Volume I, Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell (editors). Washington, DC: National Academy Press; Farley, Reynolds. 1996. *The New American Reality*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Farley, (2008); Farley and Allen (1987); Heckman, James J., and Paul A. LaFontaine. 2010. The American high school graduation rate: Trends and levels. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(2): 244–262; Jaynes, Gerald David, and Robin Murphy Williams. 1989. *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press; Oliver, Melvin L., and Shapiro, Thomas M. 1997. *Black Wealth/White Wealth*. New York/London: Routledge; and Sandefur et al. (2001).
 14. Formal obstacles to black participation in politics are gone now, swept away by hundreds of local struggles, Supreme Court decisions, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the threat of federal intervention (Valelly, Richard M. 2004. *The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press). Mostly gone, we should say. Criminal offenders typically forfeit voting rights following felony convictions. Because black Americans are much more likely to be arrested, convicted, and incarcerated than whites are, blacks are also much more likely to have their voting rights revoked on this ground. Many of the governing statutes were passed in the late 1860s and 1870s, at a time when the question of voting rights for black Americans was central to the national political debate. Restrictive laws were most common in states with large non-white prison populations (Behrens, Angela, Christopher Uggen, and Jeff Manza. 2003. Ballot manipulation and the “menace of Negro domination”: Racial threat and felon disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002. *American Journal of Sociology* 109(3): 559–605; Uggen, Christopher, and Jeff Manza. 2004. Lost voices: The civic and political views of disenfranchised felons. In *Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass Incarceration*, Mary Patillo, David Weiman, and Bruce Western (editors). New York: Russell Sage Foundation).
 15. The relevant evidence is reported in Bositis, D.A. 2001. *Black Elected Officials: A Statistical Summary 2001*. Washington, DC: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies; Jaynes and Williams (1989); and Farley (2008).
 16. Tilly (1998, p. 8).
 17. Massey, Douglas S. 2007. *Categorically Unequal*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; and Ortner, Sherry B. 1996. *Making Gender: The Politics and Erotics of Culture*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
 18. On ratification of the 19th Amendment, see McConaughy, Corrine M. 2010. The politics of suffrage extension in the American states: Party, race, and the pursuit of women’s voting rights. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. On ownership of women’s wages and on marriage entailing women’s sexual consent, see Cott, Nancy F. 2000. *Public Vows: A History of Mar-*

- riage and the Nation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. And on sexual harassment as a legal concept, see MacKinnon, Catherine A. 1987. *Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19. Goldin, Claudia. 2006. The quiet revolution that transformed women's employment, education, and family. *American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings* 96(May): 1–21. According to Goldin, “gender distinctions in work, job, and promotion were extended and solidified in the early twentieth century and became long-lived. These gender distinctions emanated from the treatment of individuals as members of a group, rather than as separate individuals.”
 20. For an introduction to this literature, see Blau, F.D., M.C. Brinton, and D.B. Grusky. Eds. 2006. *The Declining Significance of Gender?* New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Charles, Maria, and David B. Grusky. 2004. *Occupational Ghettos: The Worldwide Segregation of Women and Men*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Goldin, Claudia D. 1990. *Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women*. New York: Oxford University Press; Goldin (2006); Goldin, Claudia D., and Cecilia Rouse. 2000. Orchestrating impartiality: The impact of blind auditions on female musicians. *American Economic Review* 90(4): 715–741; MacKinnon (1987); Massey (2007); and Reskin, Barbara F., and Patricia A. Roos. 1990. *Job Queues, Gender Queues: Explaining Women's Inroads into Male Occupations*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
 21. Burns, Nancy, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. 2001. *The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and Political Participation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. An exception to gender equality in participation shows up on what Doug McAdam (1986. Recruitment to high risk activism: The case of Freedom Summer. *American Journal of Sociology* 92(1): 64–90) calls “high-risk activism.” Looting, arson, rock-throwing, and the other illegal and often violent activities that were part of the great urban eruptions of the 1960s were undertaken much more often by men than by women (e.g. Sears, David O., and McConahay, John B. 1973. *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot*. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin). Likewise, women were less apt to take part in Freedom Summer, the dangerous voting-registration project carried out in the summer of 1964 in Mississippi (McAdam 1986).
 22. Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. 1974. *Political Woman*. New York: Basic Books.
 23. As of 2010, seventeen women were serving in the U.S. Senate; seventy-three served in the House (16.8 percent); only six held governorships; and just seven occupied the mayor's office in a major U.S. city. These figures are based on information compiled by the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP), Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University (2010).
 24. On the spatial distribution of men and women in society, see Goffman (1977); Maccoby (1998).
 25. On racial segregation, see Clotfelter, C.T. 2004. *After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Farley (2008); Farley and Allen (1987); Massey (2007); and Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; and Wilson, W.J., and R.P. Taub. 2006. *There Goes the Neighborhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and their Meaning for America*. New York: Knopf.
 26. On the nature of political parties, see Aldrich, J.H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; Cohen, Marty, David Carol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. *The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform*. Chicago, IL: Uni-

- versity of Chicago Press; and Karol, David. 2009. *Party Position Change in American Politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
27. The first quotation is from Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley, p. 151; the second is from Stokes, Donald E. 1966. Party loyalty and the likelihood of deviating elections. In *Elections and the Political Order*, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (editors). New York: Wiley. Pp. 126–127. On partisanship, also see Bartels, L.M. 2000. Partisanship and voting behavior, 1952–1996. *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 35–50; Bartels, L.M. 2002. Beyond the running tally: Partisan bias in political perceptions. *Political Behavior* 24(2): 117–150; Converse, Philip E. 1966. The Normal Vote: The 1960 election. In *Elections and the Political Order*, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes (editors). New York: Wiley; and Green, D.P., B. Palmquist, and E. Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
 28. “The party systems of the 1960s,” Lipset and Rokkan concluded, “reflect, with but few significant exceptions, the cleavage structure of the 1920s.” Lipset, S.M., and S. Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: An introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (editors). New York: Free Press (p. 50).
 29. For a detailed accounting of this remarkable period in American history, see Branch, T. 1988. *Parting the Waters: America in the King Years 1954–1963*. New York: Simon and Schuster; and Branch, Taylor. 1998. *Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years 1963–65*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
 30. For more on the shift in party positions on race and the consequences for partisanship in the American public, see Carmines, E.G., and J.A. Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Green et al., (2002); Karol (2009); Kinder, D.R., and L.M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; and Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. 2005. Old times they are not forgotten: Race and partisan realignment in the contemporary south. *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 672–688. On the development of the Republican Party in the American South in the post-civil rights period, see Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 2002. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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40. This point is amply documented, in many settings and for many social groups, including class (Centers, Richard. 1949. *The Psychology of Social Classes*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Converse, Philip E. 1958. The shifting role of class in political attitudes and behavior. In *Readings in Social Psychology*, E.E. Maccoby, T.M. Newcomb, and E.L. Hartley (editors). New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Pp. 388–399), religion (Converse, Philip E. 1966. Religion and Politics. In *Elections and the Political Order*, Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes (editors). New York: Wiley.), race (Dawson, Michael C. 1995. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), and gender (Conover, P.J., and V. Sapiro. 1993. Gender, feminist consciousness, and war. *American Journal of Political Science* 37(4): 1079–1099. For a good review of the literature on racial group identification

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 45. Burns, Nancy, and Donald R. Kinder. 2007. Public opinion on gender policy: The politics of rights and roles. Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Society organizes gender with intimacy between women and men, and intimacy makes trouble for the development of the idea of the out-group. This means, perhaps surprisingly, that attitudes toward women's proper place are as available to women as to men. It turns out that women are just as likely as men to defend the traditional view of their place in society. Men who subscribe to the traditional view of women's place tend to oppose a wide range of progressive initiatives in the domain of gender. The same is true for women.
 46. This argument is spelled out in Kinder and Sanders (1996).
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