Models of Democratic Choice
Updated Mar 19, 2026
Announcements
Finish discussion of models of political cognition
Begin discussion of retrospective voting (DfR Chapter 4/5)
Begin discussion of Economic voting (DfR Chapter 6)
Next week: Finish Economic voting, Course review
Let’s talk about the group projects
Reading Reflections:
First Term Paper now due March 17
Click here be the change you want to see in this class
Here’ is the prompt for your first term paper
Here’s the grading rubric
Due March 17, 2026 by midnight.
Using what you’ve learned about public opinion in the course so far, make the case for or against citizens’ competence in a democracy. Whatever side you take in this debate, present the best evidence for your argument, consider the strongest objections to that argument, and reassure us that your claims stand inspite of these arguments. Along the way, you may want to offer some discussion of what you mean by competence, and the various roles that citizens and their opinions might play in a democracy. You should conclude by discussing the implications of your argument for democratic theory, politics, and policy.
You may structure your paper how you please, but something like:
will make it easier for your reader (and grader) to follow along.
Why are survey responses:
So unstable over time?
So sensitive to question wording and order?
Do citizens:
Background:
Zaller and Feldman address research on response instability (Converse 1964) and response effects (question wording/order effects)
Reject the assumption that citizens possess fixed, survey-ready attitudes. Attitudes are not revealed — they are constructed.
“… people are using the questionnaire to decide what their”attitudes” are (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfarber 1984; Zaller 1984; Feldman 1990).” (p. 582)
Three axioms:
Axiom 1: The ambivalence axiom. Most people have competing considerations on most issues.
Three axioms:
Axiom 1: The ambivalence axiom.
Axiom 2: The response axiom. Survey answers reflect an average of the considerations currently salient.
Three axioms:
Axiom 1: The ambivalence axiom.
Axiom 2: The response axiom.
Axiom 3: The accessibility axiom. Salience depends on stochastic sampling — recently activated ideas are more likely to be used.
Zaller and Feldman’s (1992) framework provide the microfoundations for the Recieve-Accept-Sample model of mass opinion developed by Zaller (1992)
Rather than read two chapters, we read one article and rely on me to flesh out the RAS model this week and next

Consideration: Any reason that might induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or another.
Political Awareness: “the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered.” (Zaller 1992, p. 21) generally measured by standard PK-scales
Predispositions: stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives” (Zaller 1992 p. 22)
Ambivalence: A person is ambivalent when they hold multiple, conflicting considerations
Goal: Directly observe “considerations”
Two-wave panel data from the 1987 Pilot Study of the NES
Outcomes: Close-ended policy items (job guarantees, government services, and aid to Blacks)
Paired with:
Key move: Link open ended considerations to close ended responses
Responses coded a number of ways (p. 589) to capture “ambivalence”
Still thinking about the question you just answered, I’d like you to tell me what ideas came to mind as you were answering that question. Exactly what things went through your mind. (Any others?)
Before telling me how you feel about this, could you tell me what kinds of things come to mind when you think about government making sure that every person has a good standard of living? (Any others?)
Now, what comes to mind when you think about letting each person get ahead on their own? (Any others?)
Model purports to explain a lot

Let’s condense these into the following claims:
People often hold conflicting considerations on issues (Ambivalence)
Total considerations increases with political knowledge (Reception)
People form responses from considerations at the top of their head (Response)
More consistent considerations = More stable responses (Ambivalence, Response, Resistance)
Political awareness moderates the effect of survey form
Unstable attitudes reflect underlying ambivalence
Describe attitudes as the result of a probabilistic search reflecting:
As we’ll see, the analyses here provide the foundation for the RAS model of mass opinion
Elite driven
Individuals in context
But perhaps ignores the role of groups and issues

Opinion statements, are the outcome of a process in which:
People receive new information
Decide whether to accept it based on predispositions, prior considerations, contextual knowledge
Sample at the moment of answering questions by averaging across considerations
\[Pr(Liberal)= \frac{L}{L+C}\]
People are often ambivalent on issues
Ambivalence is a function of political awareness
Response effects reflect changes in the accessibility of different considerations
Persuasion depends on both reception and acceptance
The flow of information matters (one-sided vs two-sided)
Politics is complex
People are often aware of arguments for and against particular issues

The politically aware encounter more information but accept less
The political unaware encounter less, but may reject more inconsistently

The accessibility axiom is consistent with “response effects” like:
Race of interviewer effects
Question order effects
Question wording effects
Each alter the saliency or accessibility of different considerations
\[Pr(Change) = Pr(Reception)\times Pr(Acceptance|Reception)\]
RAS is a largely a top-down model, where people draw considerations from elite discourse.
RAS predicts change when the flow of information changes
The nature of changes should differ based
Zaller (1992) articulate’s the Receive-Accept-Sample model of mass opinion
The RAS model implies that
People are often ambivalent on issues
Ambivalence is a function of political awareness
Response effects reflect changes in the accessibility of different considerations
Persuasion depends on both reception and acceptance
The flow of information matters
Dual process models distinguish between systems of cognition that are fast and slow

Taber and Lodge (2013) use this dual process framework to argue citizens
Political judgment is driven by fast affective processes that bias what becomes “thinkable”; conscious reasoning often defends the result.

The fundamental assumption driving our model is that both affective and cognitive reactions to external and internal events are triggered unconsciously, followed spontaneously by the spreading of activation through associative pathways which link thoughts to feelings, so that very early events, even those that remain invisible to conscious awareness, set the direction for all subsequent processing (p. 18)
The fundamental assumption driving our model is that both affective and cognitive reactions to external and internal events are triggered unconsciously, followed spontaneously by the spreading of activation through associative pathways which link thoughts to feelings, so that very early events, even those that remain invisible to conscious awareness, set the direction for all subsequent processing (p. 18)
Affect first (hot cognition)
Affect biases retrieval (contagion + motivated bias)
Deliberation often rationalizes (evaluation + deliberation)

Early/implicit: hot cognition, affect priming, spreading activation
Biasing mechanisms: affect contagion, motivated bias, affect transfer
Downstream/explicit: argument construction, deliberation, rationalization
Dynamics: attitude updating, belief updating
Hot cognition: all political objects have positive or negative valence
Automaticity: attitudes and behavior can be influenced by information processes that occur outside conscious awareness
Affect transfer: affective states and primes can influence current thoughts
Affect contagion: affective states and primes can influence information retrieval
Motivated reasoning prior affect will bias attention and processing of information toward those prior beliefs
As you read/review this article, try to find examples/evidence of the following:
Automaticity:
Hot cognition:
Somatic embodiment:
Primacy of affect
Online updating
Affect transfer
Affect contagion
Automatic feelings associated with an event or object
Positive or negative
Preceed and shape more “rational” deliberative thoughts
inferences of competence based solely on facial appearance predicted the outcomes of U.S. congressional elections better than chance

Illustration of hypothetical, white, Republican voter’s beliefs about Obama
When think of Obama, these additional connections are activated
The stronger the connections, more likely they are to reach consciousness

An affective contagion effect, such that an unnoticed positive prime promotes positive thoughts and inhibits negative thoughts, while an unnoticed negative prime promotes negative and inhibits positive thoughts. (p. 136)
Simple cartoon faces flashed outside the conscious awareness of experimental subjects significantly and consistently altered their thoughts and considerations on a political issue, with effects greater in size to those of prior attitudes on the issue (p. 142)

Ask participants to rate the strength of equivalent arguments
People with strong priors, greater knowledge, rate congruent arguments as stronger because retrieval/counterarguing are affect-biased (disconfirmation / counterarguing).

Dual process model of cognition
System 1: Fast, automatic, outside consciousness (How they actually make many decisions)
System 2: Slow, deliberative, conscious thought (How we think citizens should make political decisions)
Affect proceeds and shapes attitudes and behavior
Information processing is
Automaticity: Priming studies
Hot cognition: “Thin slice” cadidate evaulations
Somatic embodiment: Iowa gambling experiment
Primacy of affect fMRI studies showing affect proceeds conscious thought
Online updating Candidate evaluation and recall studies
Affect transfer “Sunny day” studies
Affect contagion Long run consequences of hot cognition and affect transfer
Implicit vs Explicit attitudes
Are priming effects short lived?
External (and internal validity)
Positive/Negative affect vs Discrete Emotions
Retrospective voting reflects an alternative response to problems raised by Converse (1964)
Redefine the problem of citizen competence
Both models depend on the quality of the information or signal citizens have
As the information environment becomes noisier, it becomes harder to select good leaders

As the information environment becomes noisier, it becomes
Harder for voters to sanction ineffective leaders
Easier for leaders to shirk their duties

So what should people base their retrospective evaluations on?
In order to ascertain whether the incumbents have performed poorly or well, citizens need only calculate the changes in their own welfare. (Fiorina 1981)

Broad consensus that economic factors matter, but lots of ongoing debates within the field of economic voting:
Macro vs Micro | Sociotropic vs Egocentric | National vs Pocketbook
Time horizons | Myopic voters
Negative vs positive shocks
Mechanisms and moderators
A&B’s critique boils down to two claims:
Take a moment to review the arguments in Chapter 5. Specifically:
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 and 5.3
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4
In Chapter 5, Achen and Bartels present evidence that voters enage in blind retrospection, punishing elected officials for events outside of their control.
They show that Woodrow Wilson’s vote totals in 1916 appear to be lower in beach counties during a summer when shark attacks in New Jersey were particularly salient
They suggest this phenomena is more general, by showing how extreme weather (droughts and floods) negatively impacts incumbent vote share.
But how robust are these results?
The shark attack example is flashy and surprising
Fowler and Hall (2018) offer compelling critiques of this particular finding
But still others find evidence of irrelevant events influencing electoral behavior:
What can we conclude?
If shark attacks and droughts were the only evidence against retrospective voting, maybe we wouldn’t feel so bad
But Achen and Bartels then attack the supposed rational foundations of retrospective voting based on economic evaluations
Voters are myopic
Do a poor job predicting competence
May be open to manipulation
Theories of Retrospective Voting seek to offer an alternative acount of democratic accountability that more realistically reflects the abilities of average citizens
Rather than assuming coherent beliefs, complete knowledge, RV asks citizens to select good leaders and sanction bad leaders using assessments of their welfare as indicator of competence
Critics of RV contend that retropsective evaluations are:
“The primary sources of partisan loyalties and voting behavior … are social identities, group attachments, and myopic retrospections, not policy preferences or ideological principles.”
“How can we tell in any given case that identity is the key moving force?”
Chapter 9 presents evidence of the important of “identities” to understanding political behavior using three types of evidence:
Historical analysis of Catholic voting behavior
Time series cross sectional survey analysis of the partisan identity and policy beliefs of White Southerners
Panel survey analysis of abortion attitudes and partisanship
Achen and Bartels present an alternative interpretation of realignment in the south emphasizing the role of social identities over standard accounts that emphasized partisan policies using the following evidence:
Analyzing trends in PID and Voting overtime (Fig 9.1) and by age cohort (Fig 9.2)
Analyzing trends in PID by policy position (Fig 9.4, 9.5)
Regression analysis predicting PID with feelings toward Southerners over time (Table 9.1)
Who are we talking about?
Who changes parties given attitudes about abortion?
Who changes attitudes about abortion given party?
Achen and Bartels conclude by considering the role of partisan identities in politics, and look at:
Partisan misperceptions of party positions
Partisan misperceptions of objective facts
The impact of scandals on unrelated partisan policies
What do we learn from Figure 10.1
How do individuals at the ends differ from individuals at the center of the scale
Why are these differences important
What are the key takeaways from table 10.1 and figure 10.2?
How do these results relate to our earlier discussions of misinformation?
What are the key coefficients in Table 10.2 and 10.3 for Achen and Bartel’s argument
How compelling and consistent are these results?
In your groups, write down:
An argument for or against competence from readings and concepts we’ve discussed so far
A counter-argument to this claim
A counter to this counter

POLS 1140