| Option | Choice | Votes |
|---|---|---|
| Jacket | Tuxedo | 12 |
| Palette | Fall (Warm + Dark) | 10 |
| Pant | Khakis | 7 |
| Patterns | Keep it simple | 10 |
| Shoe | Crocs | 9 |
| Tie | Bow tie | 17 |
| Top | Sports jersey | 11 |
Race and Ethnicity
Updated Mar 19, 2026
Today:
Broad overview of the field:
Theories of Race and Ethnicity
Racial and Ethnic Politics
Begin discussion of “Selling out” White, Laird, and Allen (2014)
Thursday
Race
Gender
Socialization and Biology in Politics:
Influence and Persuasion:
I generally take students out at the end of semester for food.
Feel free to come by Pizza Marvin at:
468 Wickenden St, Providence, RI 02903
At 5 pm on Thursday. I’ll order a couple of pies to be ready when we get there, and will order more as needed.
| Option | Choice | Votes |
|---|---|---|
| Jacket | Tuxedo | 12 |
| Palette | Fall (Warm + Dark) | 10 |
| Pant | Khakis | 7 |
| Patterns | Keep it simple | 10 |
| Shoe | Crocs | 9 |
| Tie | Bow tie | 17 |
| Top | Sports jersey | 11 |
Apparently nothing…

Race: socially constructed categories often perceived as biological
Ethnicity: shared culture, language, ancestry, or national origin
The distinction is blurry—but analytically useful. See James (2016)
Two broad perspectives (Sen and Wasow 2016):
“No causation without manipulation” (Holland 1986)
Race is not one thing—it is a collection of attributes:
Race and ethnicity are socially constructed
Consist of multiple components with varying mutability
Treating race as a “bundle” helps us study how it shapes politics
Four approaches:
Political science documents large racial differences in:
Partisanship
Participation
Political knowledge
Policy attitudes
Race is one of the strongest predictors of political behavior in the U.S.

Large differences in views on:
Race shapes how people interpret policy tradeoffs

Race strongly predicts political behavior
But:
We need theory to explain these patterns
Two key questions:
We’ll explore two answers:
Two competing theories (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998, 2006):
Evidence depends on:
Context (where contact occurs)
Type of change (gradual vs sudden)
Selection (who lives where)
Two studies to illsutrate this:
Studies reactions to immigration across communities
Key idea:
Not just diversity—but unexpected change

Threat increases when:
People react to change, not just presence

Studies how neighborhood diversity shapes attitudes
Key finding:
Supports contact hypothesis

Across racial groups:
Pattern is consistent, not group-specific

Hopkins (2010)
Oliver (2010)
👉 Key insight:
Do elected officials need to look like constituents?
Does identity shape:
👉 Central question: Does descriptive representation change politics?
Representatives share constituents’ social identities
One form of representation (Pitkin 1967):
👉 Focus: when identity itself matters
Citizen attitudes
Turnout
Legislative behavior
👉 Evidence is mixed and context-dependent
Black political empowerment → higher participation
Example:
👉 Representation can signal inclusion and efficacy

Co-ethnic candidates alone do not increase turnout
Instead:
👉 Group context may matter more than candidate identity


Descriptive representation can matter
But effects are:
👉 Identity alone does not determine outcomes
👉 We need theory to explain when it matters
Race as a social identity includes:
Membership
Identification
Consciousness
👉 Each varies across people and contexts
Assigned to a group based on shared characteristics
Defined socially—not biologically
👉 Boundaries of groups change over time

Psychological attachment to a group
Varies in:
Can be activated by cues
👉 Identity is not always salient

Junn and Masuoka 2008 find respondents randomly assigned to view co-racial cabinet member had higher levels racial identification
Identity becomes political
Includes:
👉 Bridge between identity and politics
Race is socially constructed
Identity has three components:
Each varies across:
👉 Identity must be activated to matter politically

Why have well-off Blacks seldom become more socially, economically, and politically conservative as they became upwardly mobile or as their children grew up in the middle class?
Black political homogeneity reflects a strong sense of Linked Fate
Shared experiences of disadvantage and discrimination \(\to\) a sense that:
One’s own well being depends on well being of Black Americans as whole (Linked Fate)
Dawson (1994):
Efficient when:
👉 Simplifies political decision-making

Standard survey question:
“Does what happens to Black people affect your life?”
👉 Captures perceived interdependence
Dawson (1994) finds linked fate among Blacks:
Is generally high
Doesn’t vary by class and mitigate class-based policy differences
Predicts vote choice (in 1984 and 1988 elections)
Other groups also express linked fate
But:
👉 Not uniquely Black—but especially strong

Linked fate connects identity to politics
Explains group cohesion
But:
👉 Raises questions about limits of group-based explanations
Dawson:
But:
Examples:
👉 This is the puzzle:
White, Laird, and Allen (2014) answer this:
Individuals often face tradeoffs:
👉 Why don’t more people “defect” from group interests?

How do individuals navigate:
Linked fate (heuristic) is not enough
Instead, behavior depends on:
👉 Group cohesion must be enforced, not just felt
All subjects (Black students at an HBCU):
Given $100 to allocate between Obama and Romney
Control
Incentive
Incentive + Newspaper
👉 Adds threat of social sanctions
What do you expect?
Key comparison:
👉 Does visibility change behavior?

Some individuals resist incentives even when private
👉 Norms can be internalized
But weaker than social pressure

Linked fate does not reduce defection
👉 Even strong group attachment does not prevent self-interested behavior

If your fate is tied to the group:
Possible answers:
👉 Identity alone cannot explain cohesion
Direct signals from in-group members
Increase perceived monitoring
👉 Stronger pressure → less defection

Constraint model, not preference model
Individuals will defect when possible
Cohesion reflects:
Observability is central
Public behavior \(\to\) enforced
Private behavior \(\to\) less constrained
👉 Political homogeneity is socially enforced
Individuals face real tradeoffs between self and group
Cohesion is maintained through:
Linked fate alone is insufficient
👉 Group behavior depends on social context and enforcement
Scholars often distinguish between:
Traditional measures of anti-Black prejudice among whites include:
These attitudes have generally declined over time
But:
Overt racist attitudes have declined substantially
But decline in explicit prejudice does not imply the end of racialized politics
Key question:

Many scholars argue prejudice persists, but is expressed in less overt language:
Kinder and Sanders argue contemporary racial animus reflects a mix of:
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following?
Over the past few years, black people have gotten less than they deserve.
Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Black people should do the same without any special favors.
It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if black people would only try harder they could be just as well off as white people.
Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for black people to work their way out of the lower class.
Racial resentment strongly predicts support for Trump in 2016
Interpreted by many as evidence that racial attitudes were central to contemporary partisan conflict

Grimmer, Marble, and Tanigawa-Lau (2022) shift attention from predicted probabilities to aggregate vote gains
Their argument:
This complicates simple “highest resentment \(\to\) biggest electoral change” stories

Different estimands can yield different interpretations
Key lesson:

Can racial resentment really distinguish:
This is the central critique raised by Sniderman and colleagues
Feldman and Huddy ask:
They test this directly with an experiment

Experimental manipulation:
Eight treatment conditions:
If racial resentment reflects prejudice:
If racial resentment reflects individualist ideology:
Among some respondents, racial resentment predicts lower support specifically when programs benefit Black recipients
This supports the prejudice interpretation

Reactions depend not just on race, but also on class
Racial resentment appears to work differently across combinations of deservingness and race

For liberals, racial resentment looks more like racial prejudice
It predicts opposition to racially targeted benefits in a distinctly racialized way

For conservatives, racial resentment appears more entangled with ideology
It may capture commitments to limited government and individualism as well as race

Scholars debate whether racial resentment measures prejudice or ideology
Feldman and Huddy (2005) provide evidence for both views
Opposition to racially targeted programs:
Discussion:
If racial resentment means something different for liberals and conservatives, what does that imply for how we should use it in research?
How might these findings complicate how we interpret Tesler’s (2012) results about racial resentment and health care?
Overt racism may have declined
But:


What does Tesler mean by:
What kinds of data does he use?
How does he distinguish race from partisanship?
Tesler uses both observational and experimental evidence
Observational
Experimental
Goal:
Racial resentment becomes more predictive of health care attitudes in 2009
Key claim:

Using panel data strengthens the argument
Same respondents:

Multiple analyses point in the same direction
Racial attitudes become more tightly linked to health care preferences once Obama becomes the face of reform

The pattern is not limited to one model or one dataset
The central takeaway is the same:

Racialization is visible across several measures of attitudes and support
This strengthens the spillover argument

Alternative explanation:
Since the Democratic Party is seen as more racially liberal, the relationship could be spurious
Tesler’s experiment is designed to address this
We would like to get your opinion about two current health care proposals being debated.
As you may know, [some people have / President Obama / President Clinton] proposed a plan that would guarantee health insurance for all Americans. What do you think?
[Many of these same people have / President Obama / President Clinton] also proposed a government-administered health insurance plan, often called the “public option,” to compete with private insurance. What do you think?
Same policy
Different source cue
If Obama cue produces stronger racialization than Clinton cue:

Tesler also shows similar patterns for the stimulus
This suggests the mechanism is broader than one single issue

Black support for health reform increases under Obama
Result:
This is not only about White opposition

Racial attitudes can spill over into ostensibly non-racial policy areas
The same policy becomes more racialized depending on who proposes it
Tesler’s core contribution:
This week’s papers reveal two distinct mechanisms:
| Tesler (2012) | White et al. (2014) | |
|---|---|---|
| Level | Public opinion | Political behavior |
| Mechanism | Elite cues activate racial attitudes | Group norms constrain individual choices |
| Direction | Top-down (elite \(\to\) mass) | Horizontal (peer \(\to\) peer) |
| Key finding | Same policy becomes racialized depending on who proposes it | Solidarity depends on social enforcement, not just identity |
Whiteness is everywhere in U.S. culture but it is very hard to see. … As the unmarked category against which difference is constructed, whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations.
— Lipsitz (1998)
Do Whites identify as White?
Are these identities politically relevant?
Early work shows that White group identification exists
But its link to politics appears weaker than for minority identities

Please read over the list and tell me the number for those groups you feel particularly close to—people who are most like you in their ideas and interests and feelings about things.
Roughly half of Whites report feeling close to other Whites
So:
But this measure may be relatively weak and apolitical



Wong and Cho find limited evidence that White identity strongly predicts policy views
Their conclusion:

White identity exists
These measures have some predictive validity
But:
Jardina argues earlier work understated White identity because of:

Whites are a dominant-status group
This means White identity may be especially sensitive to perceived status threat
Relevant contexts include:
Jardina defines racial consciousness for Whites as identification plus:
Jardina finds substantial levels of White identification
White racial identity is more widespread than older accounts suggested

White consciousness is also present at meaningful levels
Especially when identity is paired with competition and perceived threat


White identity and consciousness tend to be higher among:
They appear less related to:
White identity is associated with American identity
This raises an important conceptual question:

White identity predicts perceptions that Whites face discrimination
This is one pathway through which identity becomes politically consequential

White identity predicts opposition to immigration
Especially when demographic change is framed as status threat

White identity predicts support for policies perceived to benefit Whites as a group
This is evidence that White identity can structure policy preferences

White consciousness strengthens these associations further
Identity becomes more political when paired with threat and group competition

White identity also predicts support for Trump
Suggests White identity is not merely symbolic:

White racial identity exists and is politically salient
Earlier work understated its relevance because of:
Open questions remain:

POLS 1140
Social Pressure Reduces Defection