Partisanship and
Affective Polarization
Updated Mar 19, 2026
Today:
Huddy (2018)’s critique of Achen and Bartels
Review of social identity theory
Parties, partisanship and polarization
Thursday:
Race
Gender
Socialization and Biology in Politics:
Influence and Persuasion:
Click here to have a material impact on next week’s class
Tajfel and Turner (1979) articulate three components of social identity theory:
The term intersectionality references the critical insight that race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age operate not as unitary, mutually exclusive entities, but rather as reciprocally constructing phenomena (Collins 2015)
When we conceptualize identity on the level of group interaction, we bridge the individual-level psychological nature of identities and the social processes that create them. (p. 53)

Social identities are:
Socially constructed
Vary in strength and salience
Relational and intersecting
Huddy’s critiques:
Group politics is not a hollow exercise
Group-related concerns are legitimate and powerful causes for democratic action
Group-identities are not monolithic and vary in strength and effects
Let’s take some time to review the text, and find specific illustrations of this argument
Men’s shifting positions on abortion confirm Achen and Bartels’s view that partisan loyalties are far more influential than political beliefs and ideology, leading them to conclude that “ even in the context of hot button issues” such as abortion, “ most people make their party choices based on who they are rather than what they think” But this conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the authors’ own evidence that women shifted their partisanship to identify with the party that better matched their views on abortion. This is not hollow tribal politics. (p. 4)
In sum, group-linked economic and status considerations shape partisan political preferences among group members. This process may not conform to the ideals of a fully informed democratic citizenry among whom each issue is considered on its merits, but it does suggest a reason- able basis for the public’s political decision making. Feminist women, African Americans, or Latinos who support the Democratic Party and evangelical Christians who support the Republican Party because they believe it is more likely to serve their collective interests are not entirely wrong in their estimate of which party is better for their group (Layman and Carsey 2002; Wolbrecht 2000). (p. 9)
Levels of identification with politically relevant social groups thus vary among individuals, such that group political influence is far from monolithic. Those most strongly identified with a social group will be most likely to support the party seen to further the group’s interests. This process intensifies when social identities align, leading to an especially strong partisan identity. But there are many people who don’t conform to group dictates, do so weakly, or have cross-cutting social identities. Groups shape partisan loyalties, but with greater nuance than acknowledged by Achen and Bartels. (p. 10)
Huddy’s critiques:
Group politics is not a hollow exercise
Group-related concerns are legitimate and powerful causes for democratic action
Group-identities are not monolithic and vary in strength and effects
Example debate: abortion, partisanship, and citizen competence
Why this is weak
Some scholars argue that partisan identity often shapes issue positions rather than the reverse. For example, evidence on abortion attitudes shows that men’s views on abortion appear to shift to match their party loyalties, which has been interpreted as evidence that voters often make party choices based on identity rather than policy preferences (Achen and Bartels 2016).
However, this interpretation is contested. Using the same evidence, other scholars note that women appear to move their party identification toward the party that better matches their abortion views, suggesting that issue commitments can sometimes reshape partisan identity (Huddy 2018).
Why this is better
Evidence on abortion attitudes illustrates the debate over whether issue preferences or partisan identities drive political behavior. Some scholars interpret the case as evidence that partisan identity dominates issue reasoning: among men, abortion attitudes appear to shift in ways that align with prior party loyalties (Achen and Bartels 2016).
But the same case also suggests limits to this interpretation. Evidence indicates that many women shifted their party identification toward the party that better matched their views on abortion, which complicates the claim that issue attitudes simply follow partisan identity (Huddy 2018). Rather than demonstrating purely “tribal” politics, the abortion example suggests that identity and issue preferences can shape each other, especially when parties stake out clear positions on salient issues.
Why this is strongest
Don’t just cite authors. Explain:
Many definitions of political parties:
Instrumental
Organizational
Coalitional
Schattschneider (1944): Parties are “first of all an organized attempt to get power”
Schlessinger (1991): “A political party is a group organized to gain control of government in the name of the group by winning election to public office.”
V.O. Key offers an organizational view of parties highlighting the distinctions between:

“Political parties can be seen as coalitions of elites to capture and use political office. [But] a political party is more than a coalition. A political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, and procedures.” (Aldrich 1995)

Parties in the United States are best understood as coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals, which range from material self interest to high-minded idealism.
The coalition of policy-demanding groups develops an agenda of mutually acceptable policies, insists on the nomination of candidates with a demonstrated commitment to its program, and works to elect these candidates to office. (Bawn et al. 2012)
Do you think of yourself as a…
Would you call yourself a…
Would you consider yourself closer to…
Independent leaners tend to look a lot like partisans.
The importance of party identication reflects the fact that—unlike particular social identities, which may come and go as electoral forces—partisanship is relevant in nearly all elections. It shapes voting behavior, of course. But beyond that, each party organizes the thinking of its adherents. A party constructs a conceptual viewpoint by which its voters can make sense of the political world. … like particular social identities tied to the special interests of groups, the reach of partisanship is very broad. For the voters who identify with a party, partisanship pulls together conceptually nearly every aspect of electoral politics. (Achen and Bartels 2017)
Partisanship is an enduring psychological attachment:
Formed early in life
Transmitted via socialization
Acts as a perceptual screen
Shapes policy beliefs and vote choice

Partisanship was conceptualized as a psychological identification with a party…. , partisans are partisan because they think they are partisan. They are not necessarily partisan because they vote like a partisan, or think like a partisan, or register as a partisan, or because someone else thinks they are a partisan. In a strict sense, they are not even partisan because they like one party more than another. Partisanship as party identification is entirely a matter of self-definition” (Campbell et al. 1986)
Are voters “fools” (Key 1966) blindly following partisan attachments
How can we reconcile partisanship with retrospective voting?
Attempt by Fiorina (1978) to offer a rational explanation for:
Stability of partisanship
Predictive power of partisanship
Conditions in which partisanship might change
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) conceptualize partisanship as a social identity:
The same regardless of how you ask the question
Talked about in terms of groups
Stable over time among individuals
Stable in the aggregate
Stable across contexts (campaigns, state and local)
More engaged with politics
How could we distinguish between partisanship as:
\[y_{t,i} = \alpha_i + \beta_i y_{t-1,i} + \gamma_iX_{t_i} + u_i\]
\[y_{t,i} = \alpha_i + \beta_i y_{t-1,i} + \gamma_iX_{t_i} + u_i\]
Key question is about the value of \(\beta\)
Close to 1 -> Retrospective running tally
Close to 0 -> Stable social identity
Theory: Partisanship is enduring psychological attachment central to understanding American politics
Revision: Partisanship is a running tally
Synthesis: Partisanship is a social identity
Take a moment to write down a definition of partisan polarization
Is your definition about:
If you had to visualize this process, draw an image that illustrates polarization
Consider the following stylized examples
General consensus that politics has become more polarized at both the elite and mass level
Yet, polarization is a tricky concept and can refer to changes in
Animosity across party lines
“[T]he tendency of ordinary partisans to dislike and distrust those from the other party” (Druckman et al. 2019)
How has affective polarization changed since 2016?
How does affective polarization vary by partisan strenght?
library(tidyverse)
library(haven)
library(ggridges)
load("../files/data/nes_affectivepol.rda")
df %>%
filter(!is.na(affective_polarization)) %>%
ggplot(aes(year, ft_in_party, col = "In Party"))+
stat_summary()+
stat_summary(aes(y=ft_out_party, col = "Out Party"))+
stat_summary(aes(y=affective_polarization, col = "Affective Polarization"))+
theme_minimal()+
labs(col ="",
y= "Feeling Thermometer Ratitings",
x= "Year") -> fig_ap1
fig_ap1 +
facet_wrap(~pid_7pt_f)+
theme(legend.position = "bottom") -> fig_ap2
df %>%
ggplot(aes(x=ft_in_party, factor(year)))+
geom_density_ridges(fill="blue",alpha=.5)+
geom_density_ridges(aes(x=ft_out_party), fill="red", alpha=.5)+
labs(y="",
x = "Feelings toward Out Party (Red) and In Party (Blue)") -> fig_ap3


Potential causes of affective polarization:
Partisan sorting \(\to\) reinforcing social identities
High Choice/Polarized Media environment
Political campaigns
Homophily and social networks
However the evidence is often mixed or conflicting reflecting ongoing debates and research
Iyengar et al. highlight the potential non-political consequences of affective polarization in a number of areas:
Did anything strike you as particularly important, concerning, or questionable?
Take a few moments to review
How much of affective polarization is due to misperceptions of the other party’s voters?
Druckman et al. are contributing to the broader debate on affective polarization. They make four claims
H1. People overestimate the ideology and political engagement of out-partisans.
H2. Out-party animus will be higher when out-party targets are ideologically extreme
H3. Out-party animus will be higher when out-party targets are more politically engaged
H4. Affective polarization will differ according to whether the out-party targets are ideologically extreme and engaged.
Survey Experimental Design with a 3-wave panel
Outcome: Summary scale of four measures of affective polarization
## What are the results
What’s the evidence people:
overestimate the ideological extremity and enagement of outpartisans
this leads to greater out-party animus
which is greater than if folks had more accurate views
## {.smaller} ### Outparty Extremity and Engagement Increases Affective polarization

Affective polarization is an “illusion” in the sense that when people are asked to evaluate a more accurate version of the out party, they do so more positively
The irony seems to be that folk-theory type citizen (engaged, ideological) exacerbates affective polarization.
What does democracy require of it’s citizens?
Think about the topics of the course so far:
Within each topic, you should be able to find evidence that supports you’re general claim, and also consider critiques and responses
Converse shows that most citizens lake coherent, stable belief systems
Ansolabehere, however, contend that much of the instability in ideological beliefs can be explained by measurement error.
Freeder et al. however, suggest that Ansolabhere’s approach overstate’s the amount of instability due to classical measurement error.
Be specific and concrete.
Cite work supproting your claims (even better page numbers!)
Achen and Bartels’ summary is fine as catch all for some larger literatures we’d didn’t read directly.
MLA/APA/Chicago any style is fine. Just be consistent
Don’t just plug the prompt into ChatGPT

POLS 1140
Social Identity Theory